Projects · Mini Hostpapa
Security & Trust Posture
What customers trust HostKid with: shared responsibility, data boundaries, and security principles at executive level.
Security & Trust Posture
Alright. We covered how we govern in Governance, risk & compliance: ISO intent, physical security, SSDLC, deception, T-Pot, the works.
This page answers the customer-shaped version of the same question:
"Why should I trust you with my DNS, my email, and my business on a VPS?"
Hosting is a trust business. Not a logo business. Not a "we have a firewall" business. Customers hand us keys to things that hurt when they break. This doc states what we protect, what we promise, and what we explicitly do not own before anyone opens CrowdSec rules or Vault policies in Volume 22.
Here: customer promise, boundaries, principles, classification.
Volume 9 (Identity): Keycloak, MFA, session hygiene.
Volume 22 (Security): hardening, WAF, secrets, tenant isolation proof.
Volume 25 (Solutions): how sales and support explain shared responsibility without hand-waving.
My bias: I am a security person first. Trust posture is not marketing copy written after an incident. It is the contract between what we say publicly and what GRC and SSDLC prove internally.
What customers trust us with
| Asset | Sensitivity | Our duty |
|---|---|---|
| Account & billing data | High | Protect, minimize retention, encrypt in transit and at rest |
| DNS control | Critical | Prevent hijack, audit every change |
| Email mailboxes | High | Isolation, anti-abuse, deliverability hygiene |
| VPS hypervisor boundary | Critical | Tenant isolation, patch cadence, no "noisy neighbor" escape |
| Backups we manage | High | Encrypt, test restore, strict access control |
| Customer app data inside VM | Varies | Shared responsibility (see below) |
If it can take a customer offline or leak their data, we treat it like crown jewels. Even in lab phase. Especially in lab phase, because bad habits harden into architecture.
Shared responsibility model
Think AWS-style clarity at HostKid scale. No mystical "we secure everything" brochure language.
We secure the platform. Customers secure what they run on the platform.
We are responsible for:
- Security of the platform (CloudStack, network underlay, portal, billing integration)
- Hypervisor and control-plane patching
- Physical and logical isolation between tenants at the infrastructure layer
- Platform monitoring, deception intel, and incident response for our faults
- SSDLC and change discipline so we do not ship trash code (see GRC / SSDLC)
Customer is responsible for:
- Security in their VPS (OS patches, app vulns, weak passwords)
- Application code and uploaded content
- Locking down SSH, guest firewalls, secrets in their app
- Backups they chose not to buy from us (if that becomes an option)
Ambiguity here causes tickets, blame wars, and churn. Volume 25 (Solutions) must speak this model cleanly. Support must not improvise a different story on a bad day.
DNS hijack from a phished portal login is still our lane to detect and respond. Weak WordPress on their VPS is theirs to patch. Both can look like "you got hacked" in the ticket. Clarity upfront saves friendships.
Security principles (non-negotiables)
| Principle | What it means here |
|---|---|
| Secure by default | No wide-open SSH on templates. Sensible baselines via cloud-init / Ansible. |
| Least privilege | Human admin, service accounts, API keys scoped minimally. |
| Everything auditable | Who provisioned what, who changed DNS, who logged into admin. |
| Secrets never in tickets or git | Vault / secret store. Volume 22. |
| Defense in depth | Segmentation + identity + monitoring + deception, not one magic firewall. |
| Fail closed | Auth errors deny access. No stack traces leaking internals to customers. |
DevSecOps lens: security is a property of the provisioning pipeline, not a scan you run after launch. Same story as AI velocity + SSDLC in the GRC doc: ship fast, but fail the pipeline when quality regresses.
Trust boundaries (executive map)
Crossing a boundary requires identity, authorization, and logging. No anonymous shortcuts.
A line where data or control changes trust level. Every crossing should answer: who (identity), allowed? (authorization), prove it (audit log).
Detail diagrams and VLAN IDs land in Volume 5 and Volume 22. This is the executive picture you draw on a whiteboard before the audit.
Data classification (simple)
| Class | Examples | Handling |
|---|---|---|
| Public | Marketing site, public docs | Integrity matters. No secret sprawl in repos. |
| Internal | Runbooks, non-customer metrics | Staff auth only. No pasting into public tickets. |
| Confidential | Customer PII, billing | Encrypt, strict RBAC, retention rules. |
| Restricted | Secrets, keys, payment tokens | Vault. Break-glass only. No copy-paste culture. |
Maps to retention and backup rules in Volumes 18 and 22. Classification is boring until a breach lawyer asks "why was that CSV in Slack?"
High-level threat focus
Not a full STRIDE workshop. Executive priorities only. Detailed controls live in Volume 22. Risk register lives in Governance.
| Threat | Why hosting cares |
|---|---|
| Account takeover | DNS or email hijack, resource fraud, reputation damage |
| Tenant escape | One VPS touching another customer's data |
| Abuse (spam, DDoS) | IP reputation, legal exposure, upstream null routes |
| Ransomware on platform | Backups and restore drills are not optional theater |
| Insider / leaked admin | MFA, break-glass, audit, phishing exercises |
| Supply chain | Compromised dependency, vendor, or AI-generated vuln in base code |
We do not only harden against these. Deception and live attack dashboards (GRC doc) tell us what is still hitting the edge so mitigations stay honest.
What we tell customers (trust pack, future)
When we go public-facing, the trust pack includes:
| Artifact | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Shared responsibility summary | One page, no lawyer fog |
| Data handling & retention overview | What we store, why, how long |
| Subprocessor list | Registrar, payments, colo, email upstream |
| Status page & incident comms policy | How we talk when things break |
| ISO 27001 roadmap (honest stage) | Alignment intent, not a fake badge |
We document stage accurately. Customers forgive a host that is clear and improving. They do not forgive a host that claimed ISO and could not show an ISMS under stress.
What this doc does not cover
| Topic | Where it lives |
|---|---|
| Keycloak hardening, TLS cipher suites | Volumes 9, 22 |
| Fail2ban, CrowdSec, WAF rules | Volume 22 |
| T-Pot, honeypot VLANs, deception tuning | Volume 22 (intent in GRC doc) |
| Penetration test findings | Ops records / Volume 27 |
| ISO control mapping, risk register | Governance, risk & compliance |
Volume 0 wrap
You finished the executive layer of HostKid: what we are, how we make money, how boxes connect, how we measure health, how we govern, and what customers should trust us with.
Trust is the product. Everything else is packaging.
Next in the handbook: Volume 1, Internet fundamentals. Or revisit the Volume 0 overview anytime you need the map.