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Security & Trust Posture

What customers trust HostKid with: shared responsibility, data boundaries, and security principles at executive level.

Updated Aug 2, 2026 · 7 min read

Security & Trust Posture

Alright. We covered how we govern in Governance, risk & compliance: ISO intent, physical security, SSDLC, deception, T-Pot, the works.

This page answers the customer-shaped version of the same question:

"Why should I trust you with my DNS, my email, and my business on a VPS?"

Hosting is a trust business. Not a logo business. Not a "we have a firewall" business. Customers hand us keys to things that hurt when they break. This doc states what we protect, what we promise, and what we explicitly do not own before anyone opens CrowdSec rules or Vault policies in Volume 22.

Trust vs implementation

Here: customer promise, boundaries, principles, classification.
Volume 9 (Identity): Keycloak, MFA, session hygiene.
Volume 22 (Security): hardening, WAF, secrets, tenant isolation proof.
Volume 25 (Solutions): how sales and support explain shared responsibility without hand-waving.

My bias: I am a security person first. Trust posture is not marketing copy written after an incident. It is the contract between what we say publicly and what GRC and SSDLC prove internally.


What customers trust us with

AssetSensitivityOur duty
Account & billing dataHighProtect, minimize retention, encrypt in transit and at rest
DNS controlCriticalPrevent hijack, audit every change
Email mailboxesHighIsolation, anti-abuse, deliverability hygiene
VPS hypervisor boundaryCriticalTenant isolation, patch cadence, no "noisy neighbor" escape
Backups we manageHighEncrypt, test restore, strict access control
Customer app data inside VMVariesShared responsibility (see below)

If it can take a customer offline or leak their data, we treat it like crown jewels. Even in lab phase. Especially in lab phase, because bad habits harden into architecture.


Shared responsibility model

Think AWS-style clarity at HostKid scale. No mystical "we secure everything" brochure language.

The split in one sentence

We secure the platform. Customers secure what they run on the platform.

We are responsible for:

  • Security of the platform (CloudStack, network underlay, portal, billing integration)
  • Hypervisor and control-plane patching
  • Physical and logical isolation between tenants at the infrastructure layer
  • Platform monitoring, deception intel, and incident response for our faults
  • SSDLC and change discipline so we do not ship trash code (see GRC / SSDLC)

Customer is responsible for:

  • Security in their VPS (OS patches, app vulns, weak passwords)
  • Application code and uploaded content
  • Locking down SSH, guest firewalls, secrets in their app
  • Backups they chose not to buy from us (if that becomes an option)
Say this out loud in docs and sales

Ambiguity here causes tickets, blame wars, and churn. Volume 25 (Solutions) must speak this model cleanly. Support must not improvise a different story on a bad day.

DNS hijack from a phished portal login is still our lane to detect and respond. Weak WordPress on their VPS is theirs to patch. Both can look like "you got hacked" in the ticket. Clarity upfront saves friendships.


Security principles (non-negotiables)

PrincipleWhat it means here
Secure by defaultNo wide-open SSH on templates. Sensible baselines via cloud-init / Ansible.
Least privilegeHuman admin, service accounts, API keys scoped minimally.
Everything auditableWho provisioned what, who changed DNS, who logged into admin.
Secrets never in tickets or gitVault / secret store. Volume 22.
Defense in depthSegmentation + identity + monitoring + deception, not one magic firewall.
Fail closedAuth errors deny access. No stack traces leaking internals to customers.

DevSecOps lens: security is a property of the provisioning pipeline, not a scan you run after launch. Same story as AI velocity + SSDLC in the GRC doc: ship fast, but fail the pipeline when quality regresses.


Trust boundaries (executive map)

Crossing a boundary requires identity, authorization, and logging. No anonymous shortcuts.

Side definition: trust boundary

A line where data or control changes trust level. Every crossing should answer: who (identity), allowed? (authorization), prove it (audit log).

Detail diagrams and VLAN IDs land in Volume 5 and Volume 22. This is the executive picture you draw on a whiteboard before the audit.


Data classification (simple)

ClassExamplesHandling
PublicMarketing site, public docsIntegrity matters. No secret sprawl in repos.
InternalRunbooks, non-customer metricsStaff auth only. No pasting into public tickets.
ConfidentialCustomer PII, billingEncrypt, strict RBAC, retention rules.
RestrictedSecrets, keys, payment tokensVault. Break-glass only. No copy-paste culture.

Maps to retention and backup rules in Volumes 18 and 22. Classification is boring until a breach lawyer asks "why was that CSV in Slack?"


High-level threat focus

Not a full STRIDE workshop. Executive priorities only. Detailed controls live in Volume 22. Risk register lives in Governance.

ThreatWhy hosting cares
Account takeoverDNS or email hijack, resource fraud, reputation damage
Tenant escapeOne VPS touching another customer's data
Abuse (spam, DDoS)IP reputation, legal exposure, upstream null routes
Ransomware on platformBackups and restore drills are not optional theater
Insider / leaked adminMFA, break-glass, audit, phishing exercises
Supply chainCompromised dependency, vendor, or AI-generated vuln in base code

We do not only harden against these. Deception and live attack dashboards (GRC doc) tell us what is still hitting the edge so mitigations stay honest.


What we tell customers (trust pack, future)

When we go public-facing, the trust pack includes:

ArtifactPurpose
Shared responsibility summaryOne page, no lawyer fog
Data handling & retention overviewWhat we store, why, how long
Subprocessor listRegistrar, payments, colo, email upstream
Status page & incident comms policyHow we talk when things break
ISO 27001 roadmap (honest stage)Alignment intent, not a fake badge
Honesty beats badges

We document stage accurately. Customers forgive a host that is clear and improving. They do not forgive a host that claimed ISO and could not show an ISMS under stress.


What this doc does not cover

TopicWhere it lives
Keycloak hardening, TLS cipher suitesVolumes 9, 22
Fail2ban, CrowdSec, WAF rulesVolume 22
T-Pot, honeypot VLANs, deception tuningVolume 22 (intent in GRC doc)
Penetration test findingsOps records / Volume 27
ISO control mapping, risk registerGovernance, risk & compliance

Volume 0 wrap

You finished the executive layer of HostKid: what we are, how we make money, how boxes connect, how we measure health, how we govern, and what customers should trust us with.

Trust is the product. Everything else is packaging.

Next in the handbook: Volume 1, Internet fundamentals. Or revisit the Volume 0 overview anytime you need the map.